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Abstract 
The 2005 NSW decision of McCracken v Melbourne Storm Rugby League 
Football Club generated much interest as it appeared to circumvent the provisions of 
the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), the main purpose of which is to impose a cap 
on damages awards for personal injury claims and to place limitations on liability in 
negligence. Western Australia has the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), but the 
relevant section is slightly different to that of the NSW legislation. The purpose of this 
paper is to examine whether the McCracken case would be likely to be decided in the 
same way in Western Australia. If so, the administrators, clubs and players involved 
in professional sport in this jurisdiction should be mindful of the implications, such as 
the potential for more litigation as a result of injuries sustained in the course of play, 
or an increase in insurance premiums. 
Introduction 
Professional sport is 'big business' in Australia and anything that may have an effect 
on the economics of such a business is newsworthy. For this reason, the decision in the 
New South Wales (NSW) case of McCracken v Melbourne Storm Rugby League Football Club 
[2005] NSWSC 107 (McCracken) generated a lot of interest at the time because it appeared 
to circumvent the provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (CLA NSW). As the 
main purpose of the CLA NSW is to impose a cap on damages awards for personal injury 
claims and to place limitations on liability in negligence, the outcome in the McCracken 
case has serious ramifications across Australia for participants in all professional contact 
sports. The possibility of players and their club employers being successfully sued in 
respect of injuries resulting from misconduct during games is an additional cost factor that 
must be considered by the administrators of the various codes, the clubs, the players and 
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the insurers of all. This is not a new situation and players have been sued for injuries 
resulting from their misconduct during games in the past. For example, in Canberra in 
1971 an Australian Rules Football player who received a sharp blow to the head during a 
game sued another player for damages; in NSW in 1993 a professional rugby league 
footballer who received a badly broken jaw during a game sought damages from another 
player and the player's club.1 However, it might well have been expected that legislation 
such as the CLA NSW, which is intended to impose limits on civil liability, would have 
extinguished this avenue for compensation or at least placed a statutory cap on any award 
of damages.  
All Australian states and territories have statutes limiting civil liability, but there are 
variations in the legislation, as later discussed. Western Australia (WA) has the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (WA) (CLA WA), but the wording in the relevant section is slightly 
different to that of the NSW legislation. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether 
the McCracken case would be likely to be decided in the same way in Western Australia. If 
so, the administrators, clubs and players involved in professional sport in this jurisdiction 
should be mindful of the implications, such as the potential for more litigation as a result 
of injuries sustained in the course of play or an increase in insurance premiums. 
This paper is in three parts. The first part discusses the facts and decision in the 
McCracken case. The second part looks at the background to the reform of the law of 
negligence in Australia, outlines the reforms that have now taken place and compares the 
relevant wording of the CLA NSW with the CLA WA. The third part examines the 
meaning of the wording in the WA Act with a view to establishing the intention behind 
the relevant phraseology. This requires reference being made to the definition sections of 
this Act and other legislation, and to Hansard and various legal sources including cases. 
Finally, the paper concludes that the case may well be decided in the same way in a WA 
court and that, therefore, clubs and players in WA should not assume that the wording in 
the CLA WA protects them from liability in similar circumstances. 
Part 1 - The McCracken Case 
Mr Jarrod McCracken, the plaintiff, previously played for the Wests Tigers Rugby 
League Football Club. McCracken was injured as the result of a dangerous tackle carried 
out on him by two members of the Melbourne Storm during a first grade match and has 
not played rugby league again. McCracken sued the two players, Mr Stephen Kearney and 
Mr Marcus Bai, and the Melbourne Storm Club for damages in negligence and trespass.  
There were no other remedies available to McCracken as it seems he may have been 
unable to make a claim under the NSW Sporting Injuries Scheme. This scheme is 
administered by the NSW Sporting Injuries Committee under the Sporting Injuries Insurance 
Act 1978 (NSW) and applies when a sportsperson, who is a registered participant of a 
sporting organisation, suffers a compensable injury (section 19[1][a]). Although NSW 
clubs involved in the National Rugby League competition in which McCracken was 
playing are members of the Scheme (NSW Government, no date), the extent of 
McCracken's injury rendered him ineligible for cover. According to McCracken's lawyer 
Bernie Gross, in an on-air interview with Damian Carrick on ABC Radio National in 
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March 2005, McCracken suffered: 'Basically injury to the vertebrae of his neck that 
involves soft tissue and bony injury, which made it totally unsafe for him to ever go back 
on the football field'. The Scheme provides lump sum payments only for permanent 
disablement or death and although McCracken's injury was serious and prevented him 
from ever playing or training again, it did not meet any of the eligibility thresholds under 
Table A of the Sporting Injuries Insurance Regulation 2004 (NSW). 
The McCracken case was heard in the Supreme Court of NSW. There were difficulties 
obtaining information relating to the extent of the plaintiff's economic loss and, as waiting 
for the necessary documentation would have resulted in an adjournment, the parties 
agreed that issues relating to liability and issues relating to damages would be heard 
separately. On the issue of liability, the Judge, Hulme J, found in favour of the plaintiff. In 
doing so, he determined that the provisions of the CLA NSW were excluded from the 
case which meant that the various limitations imposed by the Act did not apply to the 
injured plaintiff. 
The details of the facts and decision as set out in the case are as follows. In May 
2000 the Wests Tigers were playing the Melbourne Storm at Olympic Park in Melbourne; 
McCracken was captain of the Wests Tigers at the time. McCracken had possession of the 
ball and was approximately ten metres from the Melbourne Storm's goal line. Together, 
Kearney and Bai tackled McCracken by lifting him up and tipping him over, causing him 
to fall down in a way that meant his head made contact with the ground first; in other 
words, a spear tackle. Kearney and Bai were charged by the National Rugby League 
(NRL) with having made a dangerous throw and both pleaded guilty. The details of the 
charge were that in 'effecting a tackle on … Jarrod McCracken, (the Defendant) lifted him 
to a dangerous position causing him to fall head first to the ground' (McCracken: para. 23). 
Under Section 15 of the Laws of the Game of the Australian Rugby League, 'a player is 
guilty of misconduct if he uses any dangerous throw when effecting a tackle' (McCracken: 
para. 24). During the hearing, Kearney and Bai gave evidence by video link as both of 
them were in England playing rugby league at the time. The following exchange took 
place during the cross-examination of Bai (McCracken: para. 19):   
Q. Put aside the play the ball you were in, you are intending to put Mr McCracken 
    hard on the ground in the tackle, are you not [sic]? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You did not intend to cause him serious injury to his head or neck, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. Is it the intention that you intended to do some minor injury by at least driving 
    him to the ground vigorously? 
A. Yes.  
When he had summarised the evidence, Hulme J stated (McCracken: para. 37):  
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Many of the matters to which I have referred lead inevitably to the conclusion that the 
Defendants breached the duty of care that they owed to the Plaintiff. I am further 
satisfied that the intent of both of the Defendants in the tackle was to injure the 
Plaintiff. I do not by that suggest that injury of the severity that occurred was intended, 
but the evidence of… Mr Bai… satisfies me that some injury was intended by each of 
the Second and Third Defendants.  
Hulme J then turned to the matter of whether or not the CLA NSW would apply. Section 
3(B)(1)(a) states that the provisions of the Act do not apply 'in respect of an intentional 
act that is done with intention to cause injury or death…' After a brief discussion on the 
issue of whether the NSW Parliament had intended this to apply only to intentional 
criminal conduct, Hulme J gave the words of s 3(B) their ordinary English meaning 
(McCracken, 2005: para. 41). Section 3(B)(1)(a) of the CLA NSW has two limbs. The first 
is the 'intentional act'; this was satisfied in the McCracken case by Hulme J's acceptance 
that the actions of Kearney and Bai in executing the tackle manifested the intention that 
the plaintiff should come to the ground heavily (an intentional act). The second limb, 
'with intention to cause injury …', was satisfied by Hulme J's acceptance that Kearney and 
Bai intended some injury even if it was not of the seriousness that eventuated (Madden, 
2005). 
As a result, Hulme J found that the defendants had intended to cause injury, albeit 
not to the extent that had actually occurred, and so the provisions of the CLA NSW were 
excluded. Having decided in favour of the plaintiff against each of the defendants on the 
issue of liability, the matter of damages remained to be assessed (McCracken, 2005). Recent 
newspaper reports suggest that the claim was in the order of $1.4 million for football 
earnings alone (Magnay & Lamont, 2005). In August 2005, there was a hearing on 
quantum, but as at October 2006 no judgment has yet been made. The amount of 
damages awarded to McCracken will determine whether or not the defendants decide to 
appeal.2  
Part 2 - Background to the Reform of the Law of Negligence in Australia 
The so-called 'insurance crisis' in Australia brought about an explosive rise in 
premiums for some parties, such as organisations with high levels of public traffic, 
shopping centres (in relation to 'slip and fall' risks), local governments and the organisers 
of high-risk social activities (i.e., sky diving, horseback trail riding), and non-availability of 
insurance coverage for others, such as independent midwives (Senate Economic 
References Committee, 2002). In a report prepared for a meeting of ministers in March 
2002, Trowbridge Consulting stated that premium increases of 20 percent were 'routine', 
100 percent 'not uncommon' and increases of 500 percent to 1000 percent had occurred 
(Senate Economic References Committee, 2002: 21). One reason for the insurance crisis 
was believed to be the way in which judicial decisions in negligence cases had become 
increasingly plaintiff-orientated at the expense of the defendant, with the defendant's deep 
pocket insurer suffering the consequences (Spigelman, 2003).  
In 2002, following meetings involving ministers from Australia's Commonwealth, 
State and Territory Governments, it was agreed that the Hon David Ipp would Chair a 
 33
panel of four eminent persons to review the operation of the law of negligence. The focus 
of the Panel's terms of reference was primarily on liability for negligently caused personal 
injury and death. The Panel of Eminent Persons handed down its report in two parts: one 
in August 2002 and the second in September 2002. The resulting Review of the Law of 
Negligence Report is referred to as the Ipp Report. 
For the sake of national uniformity, the Ipp Report's first recommendation is that all 
the ensuing recommendations with respect to civil liability should be incorporated into a 
single statute to be enacted in each jurisdiction (Ipp Report, 2002). This has not occurred 
and there are variations in the provisions of civil liability legislation in the different 
Australian jurisdictions. In WA, the Ipp Report recommendations are incorporated, with 
some modification, into the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) as amended by the Civil Liability 
Amendment Act 2003 (WA) (both of which constitute the CLA WA).  
Two of the principal objectives of the CLA WA which are of particular relevance to 
this paper are: placing limitations on liability in negligence; and imposing a cap on 
damages awards for personal injury claims. Where a plaintiff (the injured sportsperson) 
sues in negligence, the CLA WA makes changes, favourable to the defendant, to the way 
in which the judiciary can apply the law. In situations with facts similar to those of the 
McCracken case, Part 1A Division 6, headed 'Liability for harm caused by the fault of a 
person'/'Assumption of risk' has the potential to exclude a defendant's liability entirely:  
5N. Injured persons presumed to be aware of obvious risks 
(1) In determining liability for damages for harm caused by the fault of a person, the person who 
suffers harm is presumed to have been aware of the risk of harm if it was an obvious risk, unless 
the person proves on the balance of probabilities that he or she was not aware of the risk. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, a person is aware of a risk if the person is aware of the type or 
kind of risk, even if the person is not aware of the precise nature, extent or manner of occurrence 
of the risk. 
Section 5G of the CLA NSW is virtually identical, except that it refers to 'negligence' 
rather than 'fault of a person'. An 'obvious risk' is defined in s 5F(1) of the CLA WA as 'a 
risk that, in the circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the 
position of that person'. Section 5F(2) says 'Obvious risks include risks that are patent of a 
matter of common knowledge' and s 5F(3) states 'A risk of something occurring can be an 
obvious risk even though it has a low probability of occurring'. Section 5F of the CLA 
NSW is identical. Although it is not spelt out in so many words, the heading 'Assumption 
of risk' in both the WA and NSW legislation indicates that in the right circumstances the 
plaintiff assumes the risk or, in other words, consents to the defendant's behaviour and 
the defendant is, therefore, not liable for the injury caused. 
The second objective of the CLA WA is accomplished by Part 2, which is headed 
'Awards of personal injuries damages'. Part 2 of the CLA NSW has similar provisions. 
Part 2 Division 1 of the CLA WA states that the Part applies to an award of personal 
injury damages which are sought to be recovered in any civil action arising out of an 
incident that happens after the commencement of the provisions. This means the cap on 
damages is not limited to negligence actions and includes other torts, such as trespass to 
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person, as well as other civil actions such as breach of contract. Part 2 Division 2 restricts 
damages for non-pecuniary loss. This is listed in s 9(4) as pain and suffering, loss of 
amenities of life, loss of enjoyment of life, curtailment of expectation of life and bodily or 
mental harm. Part 2 Division 3 fixes damages for pecuniary loss, such as loss of earnings 
and the provision of home care services. Section 11(1) provides that the court 'is to 
disregard earnings lost to the extent that they would have accrued at a rate of more than 3 
times the average weekly earnings at the date of the award'. Likewise, s 12(2) of the CLA 
NSW has the following wording: 
In the case of any such award, the court is to disregard the amount (if any) by which 
the claimant's gross weekly earnings would (but for the injury or death) have exceeded 
an amount that is 3 times the amount of average weekly earnings at the date of the 
award.  
These limitations are of great significance for a high-earning professional sports star if the 
injury finishes that sporting career. 
The Ipp Report also states that the Panel had not 'considered liability for 
intentionally or recklessly caused personal injury and death' (Ipp Report, 2002: 13). This 
explains the exclusory provisions contained in s 3(B)(1)(a) of the CLA NSW; that 
defendants cannot benefit from the limitations on liability provided by the legislation if 
the act causing injury or death is intentional or reckless. The CLA WA equivalent of the 
CLA NSW provision was not included in the Bill that was tabled originally in the WA 
Parliament.3 It was included later by an amendment to the Bill and appeared in the 
original version of the CLA WA as s 6 in Part 2 Division 1.4 The 2003 amendments 
restructured the CLA WA so the provisions are now in s 3A 'Damages excluded from 
Act'.5 The exclusions are set out in a table in s 3A(1) and the relevant wording is 'an 
unlawful intentional act that is done with an intention to cause personal injury to a person, 
whether or not a particular person'. Like the CLA NSW, this has two limbs: being 'an 
unlawful intentional act' and 'done with an intention to cause personal injury to a person'. 
The inclusion of the word 'unlawful' in the first limb, however, differentiates the two Acts 
and, on the surface at least, appears to make it harder for a plaintiff in WA to satisfy the 
requirements of the provision.  
The two Acts differ in another way. The CLA NSW makes this Act retrospective, so 
it applies to any incident that occurred prior to the commencement of the Act except for 
decisions of a court made before the commencement day.6 There was an exception in 
relation to claims made against the Crown, so the NSW Government did not benefit from 
the retrospectivity (NSW Parliamentary Hansard, 2002). The CLA WA, on the other 
hand, applies only to incidents happening on or after the date that the various Parts came 
into operation. This is effected by a section at the start of each Part in the CLA WA. 
Where a person (the plaintiff) has suffered personal injury or death due to the negligence 
of another (the defendant), this difference is of great significance. In NSW, all defendants 
benefit from the limitations on liability and damages imposed by the CLA NSW 
regardless of when the incident happened (subject to statutory limitation periods). In WA, 
the benefits for the defendant only apply if the incident occurs after the relevant provision 
of the CLA WA came into operation.  
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Part 3 - The CLA WA and its Application to the McCracken Case 
The question that needs to be examined in this part is whether the inclusion of the 
word 'unlawful' would bring about a different result if the McCracken case came before the 
courts in WA. As mentioned above, Hulme J in the McCracken case considered whether 
the NSW Parliament had intended the exception contained in s 3(B)(1)(a) of the CLA 
NSW to apply to criminal conduct only. This point (i.e., in relation to the intention that 
the exception would apply to criminal conduct only) had been raised by counsel for the 
defendant in reference to a comment made during the second reading speech when the 
Bill was progressing through the lower house of the NSW Parliament. Mr Bob Carr, then 
Premier of NSW, had said (NSW Parliamentary Hansard, 2002: 2085):  
Importantly, intentional acts done with intent to cause injury or death or acts involving 
sexual assault are excluded. This exclusion ensures that the compensation for injures 
arising from serious criminal acts is not limited by this bill.   
The reference to criminal conduct is not reflected in s 3(B)(1)(a) of the CLA NSW which 
says only that the Act does not apply 'in respect of an intentional act', thus enabling 
Hulme J to grant a wider rather than a narrower operation to the section (McCracken, 
2005: para. 41).  
Therefore, by implication, the reference to an 'unlawful intentional act' in s 3A(1) of 
the CLA WA means it has a narrower operation than the equivalent provision in the 
NSW legislation. To determine the scope of the clause in the CLA WA, it is necessary to 
examine the meaning of the word 'unlawful' in that context. There is no definition of 
'unlawful' in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) or the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 
(WA). Neither is there any definition in the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) or the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). The more obvious of the general legislation covering criminal 
acts, the Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA) and the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), offer no 
definition either.7 
As noted above, the provisions in 3A(1) of the CLA WA were not in the original 
Bill. The section was then incorporated by amendment into the part of the Bill confined 
to 'Personal Injury Damages'. The Hon Mark McGowan, who at the time was the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the WA Premier, said the following when introducing the 
amendment in the WA Parliament (WA Parliamentary Hansard, 2002: 1987): 
This… will ensure that the deductible provisions, the threshold and the other 
arrangements contained in the Bill that would affect plaintiffs do not apply to 
intentional or criminal acts; that is, the deductible provisions would not apply if 
someone were pursuing a person for a criminal offence. For instance, if I were to 
assault the member for Merredin and he pursued me through the courts, I would not 
benefit because I had committed a criminal offence and the deductible of $12 000 
would not be removed from his payout. These provisions are designed to apply to a case 
of negligence and not to a criminal situation. 
Thus, it may be assumed that the minister considered that 'unlawful' has the same 
meaning as 'criminal' in this context.8 As also noted above, the 2003 amendments to the 
provisions were moved to the beginning so as to be of general application to the Act as a 
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whole. The application of 3A(1) of the CLA WA requires the plaintiff to show the 
defendant's act was not only intentional but criminal (the first limb) and that it was done 
with an intention to cause personal injury (the second limb).  
The example of a criminal act used in the McGowan speech was that of assault and 
this is the offence most likely to be committed in a contact sport situation by one player 
against another. The relevant wording of s 222 of the Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA) defines 
assault as: 
A person who strikes, touches, or moves, or otherwise applies force of any kind to the 
person of another, either directly or indirectly, without his consent… is said to assault 
that other person, and the act is called an assault. 
Section 223 says 'An assault is unlawful and constitutes an offence unless it is authorised 
or justified or excused by law'.  
To understand what is meant by 'unlawful' in the civil law system, it is necessary to 
look at some decided cases. The civil law equivalent of the criminal offence of assault is 
the tort of trespass to person. Trespass to person comprises 'assault', 'creating in another 
person an apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive conduct', and 'battery', when 
the threat transpires into action. In layman's language 'assault' is taken to mean both, but 
technically the two are different (Fleming, 1998). If a civil action for trespass (battery) is to 
succeed, there must be a positive act. An omission or inaction will not amount to trespass, 
but it is not necessary that the act be forcible, or hostile or that the defendant intended 
injury to result. If, for example, a player's arm injures another player, it is a trespass if the 
offending arm is swung deliberately, regardless of whether there is any intention to injure. 
If, however, the motion of the arm is involuntary, perhaps because of a tackle, this does 
not give rise to trespass because the act is unintentional.9 On the face of it, any intentional 
physical contact in a sporting situation qualifies as an assault, but it is not unlawful 
because the circumstances authorise or justify the activities.  
If the behaviour is outside the rules of the game, however, the situation is different. 
There are a number of cases in Australia on this point. For example, in Rogers v Bugden 
(1993) (Rogers), a civil action, Bugden was found to have assaulted Rogers during a Rugby 
League match. Rogers' jaw was broken requiring surgery and extensive dental work. The 
trial judge, Lee CJ, decided in favour of the plaintiff, concluding that the assault was a 
blow to Rogers' head by Bugden's forearm, done deliberately and with intent to hurt and 
contrary to the rules of the game (Rogers). An appeal to the NSW Court of Appeal on the 
issue of liability was dismissed and damages were increased. Bugden was ordered to pay 
$79,154.60, which included $7500.00 in exemplary damages, and Canterbury Bankstown 
Rugby League Football Club Ltd was ordered to pay $71,654.60 (the club was vicariously 
liable as the employer of Bugden); costs were awarded against the defendants (Rogers). 
'Consent' is the only defence to a trespass action, but how the defence works is not 
straightforward. It might be thought that compliance with the rules of the particular game 
would be a good indicator of whether or not the plaintiff 'consented' to the invasion of 
his/her person by the defendant. If the defendant 'intends to cause bodily harm or knows, 
or ought to know, that such harm is the likely result of his actions', the defence does not 
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apply.10 This is clearly explained by Fox J in McNamara v Duncan (1976) (McNamara) 
(McNamara: 588):  
I do not think it can be reasonably held that the plaintiff consented to receiving a blow 
such as he received in the present case. It was contrary to the rules and was deliberate. 
Forcible bodily contact is of course part of Australian Rules football, as it is with 
some other codes of football, but such contact finds justification in the rules and usages 
of the game. Winfield (op cit) says (at 748) in relation to a non-prize fight, 'a boxer 
may consent to accidental fouls, but not to deliberate ones'. Street on Torts (4th ed p 
75) deals with the presumed ambit of consent in cases of accidental injury 'A 
footballer consents to those tackles which the rules permit, and, it is thought to be those 
tackles contravening the rules where the rule infringed is framed to maintain skill of 
the game: but otherwise if his opponent gouges out an eye or perhaps even tackles 
against the rules and dangerously.' Prosser Law of Torts (3rd ed p 103) says, 'One 
who enters into a sport, game or contest may be taken to consent to physical contacts 
consistent with the rules of the game' [references omitted].  
In this case, the plaintiff was injured while playing Australian Rules football. The plaintiff 
had possession of the ball and kicked it away just before the defendant, who was playing 
for the opposing team, hit him in the head. In the evidence given by witnesses, there were 
some differences of opinion as to what actually happened, but Fox J was satisfied with the 
evidence of a field umpire who said that the defendant struck the plaintiff with his elbow 
(McNamara). The plaintiff's skull was fractured, he was operated on for an extradural 
blood clot that same night and six months later he had to have a protective plate inserted 
in his skull. He was, however, able to return to his job as a public servant after 
approximately six weeks and most of his symptoms wore off except for discomfort in the 
left leg due to nerve damage (McNamara). Finding in favour of the plaintiff, Fox J 
concluded that the defendant struck the plaintiff intentionally and contrary to the rules of 
the game. He dismissed the contention of the defendant's counsel that 'a little bit of foul 
play is a common, if not invariable, concomitant of a game of football' and 'the plaintiff 
must be treated as having accepted the risk that it would happen' (McNamara, pp. 587-
588). Reasons given by Fox J for excluding the defence of consent are stated in the extract 
above. Damages of $6000.00 were awarded to the plaintiff, with costs (McNamara). 
It is demonstrated through the above decisions, and from the McCracken case, that if 
the activity of the defendant is found to infringe the rules of the game, it will amount to 
an assault (in the broad sense of assault including battery) on the plaintiff. If the defendant 
is found guilty of misconduct by the sporting body in control of that particular code, the 
decision by the judge is much easier to make. An assault on a person is an unlawful act in 
both the criminal law and the civil law, so for the purposes of the CLA WA, the 'unlawful 
intentional' act in these circumstances is no different to that of the 'intentional' act 
required by the CLA NSW. Therefore, where such a plaintiff in WA can show that the 
defendant's act was unlawful and intentional, which would be satisfied if the defendant 
acted contrary to the rules and intended to cause injury, the latter of which would be 
harder to prove, the CLA WA does not apply. There may be occasions where the facts of 
a case would bring about a different result in the two jurisdictions, but not in the 
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McCracken case. This paper argues that it is likely that the case would be decided the same 
way under the WA legislation.   
Conclusion 
The purpose of both the CLA WA and the CLA NSW is to impose a cap on 
damages awards for personal injury claims and to place limitations on liability in 
negligence. It may have been thought by all those involved in professional sport in WA 
and NSW that any injuries incurred during fixtures by one player as a result of the actions 
of another player would be caught by the provisions of the respective legislation, 
precluding civil liability. The McCracken decision has shown that this cannot be taken for 
granted and, where the plaintiff in NSW can show that the act was intentional and in WA 
unlawful and intentional and intended to cause injury, the legislation is circumvented. The 
inclusion of the word 'unlawful' in the CLA WA is unlikely to make any difference in a 
case with similar facts to those in McCracken. All those involved in professional sport in 
WA must be aware that there are still circumstances in which the CLA WA provides no 
assistance to the defendant, so players and their club employers may be successfully sued 
in respect of injuries resulting from misconduct during games. The potentially large 
damages awards and costs resulting from such legal actions are an additional economic 
factor that must be considered by the administrators of the various codes, the clubs, the 
players and their insurers.   




Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)  
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)  
Australian Capital Territory Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) 
New South Wales 
 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) 
Sporting Insurance Act 1978 (NSW) 
Northern Territory 
 
Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 
2003 (NT) 
Queensland Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) 
South Australia Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) 
Tasmania Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) 
Victoria Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) 
Western Australia 
 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) 
Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA)  
Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA) 
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) 
Source: Original table. 
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Appendix B: Cases 
Giumelli v Johnston (1991) Aust Torts Reports 81-085. 
 
McCracken v Melbourne Storm Rugby League Football Club [2005] NSWSC 107 (22 February 
2005). 
 
McNamara v Duncan (1976) 26 ALR 584. 
 
Rogers v Bugden (unreported, 14 February 1990 Supreme Court of New South Wales) and 
on appeal at (1993) Aust Tort Reports 81-246. 
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1 Respectively McNamara v Duncan (1976) 26 ALR 584 and Rogers v Bugden (unreported, 14 February 
1990, Supreme Court of New South Wales) and on appeal at (1993) Aust Tort Reports 81-246. 
 
2 The authors would like to thank Robert Crittenden, lawyer for the three defendants at the time of 
the hearing, for providing information regarding the case (such as the assessment of damages and 
the issue of any appeal) (email correspondence between the authors and Robert Crittenden 
during October 2006). Crittenden also comments that it was surprising how quickly liability 
judgment was handed down (almost immediately after completion of the hearing); he had 
expected the decision to take a few months because it was such a 'tricky' case. He expects a 
finding on quantum before the end of 2006, but is also surprised that this aspect has taken so 
long (notes taken during a telephone conversation between the authors and Robert Crittenden: 
19 October 2006).  
 
  After this article was completed it was reported that Jarrod McCracken had been awarded $97,000 
in damages. According to the report, 'McCracken had been seeking at least $350,000 in damages' 
(CCH Daily Alert, 23 November 2006). A three month holding summons has been placed on the 
case during which time either party may appeal the decision. The holding summons expires on 
the 20 March 2007. It seems that both parties are unhappy with the verdict - the plaintiff is 
considering appealing against the finding relating to the award of damages, while the defendants 
are considering appealing against the original finding of liability (notes taken during a telephone 
conversation between the authors and James McLean of Moray & Agnew, current lawyer for the 
defendants, 23 February 2007).  
 
3 The situation in the other Australian jurisdictions is varied. Because of the wording in s 50 and s 
93 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) and in s 4 of the Personal Injuries (Liabilities and 
Damages) Act 2003 (NT), the limitations on civil liability could not be circumvented as they were 
in the McCracken decision. The wording in s 3(B)(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) is the 
same as that in the relevant provision of the CLA NSW. Sections 28C(2)(a) and 28LC(2)(a) of the 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) and s 51 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) have similar exclusions located 
in the parts of the respective Acts imposing a cap on the amount of damages that can be awarded. 
Section 52(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) has similar exclusionary wording to that of the 
CLA WA, but only in respect of the awarding of exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages. It is 
of particular note that the states and territories have ignored Recommendation 1 of the Ipp 
Report. The difference between the jurisdictions promises a minefield of litigation. 
 
4 Part 2 is headed 'Personal Injury Damages'; Division 1 is headed 'Preliminary'. 
 
5 Section 3A appears in Part 1, headed 'Preliminary'. 
 
6 CLA NSW Schedule 1 Clause 18(1) and Schedule 1 Clause 18(3)(a). 
 






8 The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (1972) defines 'unlawful' as 'prohibited by law; illegal; against rules' 
and 'criminal' as 'of the nature of or involving a crime or grave offence', respectively p 2306 and p 
423. Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law (Burke, 1977: 1834) states that 'unlawful' and 'illegal' are 
generally the same. 
 
9 See commentary in the Australian Torts Reporter, 18, 501. 
 
10 This was stated in Giumelli v Johnston (1991) Aust Torts Reports 81-085, per King CJ, at 68, 709. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
